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RECENT FORENSIC DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE FIELD OF ALCOHOLISM
PETER BARTON Hurr*
This paper will review the legal issues important in the field of alco-
holism today. It will begin by describing the history of the develop-
ment of the criminal law pertaining to alcoholism prior to 1966. The
decisions handed down in early 1966, in the Easter1 and Driver2 cases,
which have drastically changed the prior law, will then be discussed.
Finally, the major portion of the article will be devoted to the very
complex legal issues that are yet to be resolved, and that will determine
the future course of alcoholism treatment programs in the State of Vir-
ginia and the rest of this country.
I
Under early English common law, public intoxication was not, in
itself, a crime. Only drunkenness accompanied by a public nuisance, or
a breach of the peace, was considered criminal.3
Mere public intoxication was first made a criminal offense by an
English statute in 1606, the text of which is as revealing as it is amusing:
"AN ACT FOR REPRESSING THE ODIOUS AND LOATH-
SOME SIN OF DRUNKENNESS" "WHEREAS, The loathsome
and odious sin of drunkenness is of late grown into common use
within this realm, being the root and foundation of many other
enormous sins, as bloodshed, stabbing, murder, swearing, fornication,
adultery, and such like, the great dishonor of God, and of our nation,
the overthrow of many good arts and manual trades, the disabling
of divers workmen, and the general impoverishing of many good
subjects, abusively wasting the good creatures of God:
* B.A., Yale, 1956; LL.B., Harvard, 1959; LL.M., N.Y.U., 1960. Member of the New
York and District of Columbia bars; associated with Covington & Burling, Washing-
ton, D.C. (This paper was delivered as the Dr. John Minson Galt Memorial Lecture at
Eastern State Hospital, Williamsburg, Virginia, on September 23, 1966.) ed. note.
1. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc), rev'g 209
A.2d 625 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965).
2. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966), rev'g 243 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C.
1965).
3. See, e.g., 19 C.J. Drunkards 5 6 (1920); Moser v. Fulk, 237 N.C. 302, 74 S.E. 2d 729
(1953).
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"II. Be it therefore enacted . . . That all and every person or per-
sons, which shall be drunk,... shall for every such offense forfeit and
lose five shillings,... to be paid ... to the hands of the churchwardens
.. (3) and if the offender or offenders be not able to pay ... shall be
committed to the stocks for every offense, there to remain by the
space of six hours." 4
Today, public intoxication remains a criminal offense, with varying
penalties, in virtually every part of the United States' and Canada,6 as
well as abroad.
The initial legal recognition of what is now known as chronic alco-
holism appeared in Lord Hale's classic treatise, Pleas of the Crown,
written in about 1675 but not published until 1736. Lord Hale, who is
credited with being the first legal authority to have undertaken any
significant analysis of the relationship of mental disease and the criminal
law,7 concluded that drunkenness would not excuse criminal activity ex-
cept in two situations: First, when it was caused by the "stratagem or
fraud of another;" and second, when long-continued drinking had
resulted in what he called an "habitual and fixed phrensy"- which ap-
pears to be an early description of alcoholism.'
In time, the courts recognized Lord Hale's first exception as an exam-
4. 4 James 1, c. 5 (1606).
5. United States Attorney General Katzenbach, in testifying on July 22, 1965 before
an Ad Hoc Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Law Enforcement
Assistance Act of 1965, stated that "of the approximately six million arrests in the
United States in 1964, fully one-third were for drunkenness," and added that "better
ways to handle drunks than tossing them in jail should be considered.' The President
later established a President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia and a
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1 Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents 5-9 (August 2, 1965), both of whith have been
studying the problem of drunkenness. The author has been a consultant on this problem
to the staffs of both commissions. Tim REPORT OF THE PRESIDFNT'S CoMMIssION ON
CRIME IN im DismRicr OF COLuMBIA, dated December 15, 1966, was released to the
public on January 1, 1967, and will be cited in this paper as the D.C. CRIME COMMIS-
SiON REPORT. Section I of Chapter 7 of the REPORT, at 474-503, is devoted to "The
Drunkenness Offender." THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND ADMINIsTRATION OF JusTicE was released to the public on February 18, 1967
and will be cited in this paper as the U.S. CRIME COMMISSION REPORT. Chapter 9. of
this REPORT, at 232-237, is devoted to "Drunkenness offenders.'
6. For an enlightening discussion of the Canadian law pertaining to drunkenness
see Alexander, Responsibility and Addiction: The Law in Canada, and Reid, Legislation
to Control Addiction, 13 Addictions, no. 4 pp. 11, 36 (1966).
7. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 435 (1869).
8. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CRowN ch. IV. (1736).
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pie of the broader common law rule that involuntary behavior can-
not be criminal,9 and his second exception as an example of the nar-
rower rule that insanity excuses what would otherwise be criminal
conduct.'0 An awareness of the fundamental tension between the "in-
voluntary behavior" rule and the "insanity" rule is essential to an under-
standing of the handling of alcoholics in our courts during the past
100 years.
The "involuntary behavior" rule applies broadly to all human activity,.
Its rationale is that it would be inhuman, as well as futile, to punish
an individual for behavior which he lacked the capacity to control.
The term "insanity" on the other hand, describes just one of many
possible causes of involuntary behavior. Judicial use of this term would
have caused no problem if its content had been analyzed and applied
in terms of the more basic standard of voluntariness. Regrettably, how-
ever, the judiciary rapidly moved on to a new standard. The famous
M'Nagbten's Case," decided in England in 1843, enunciated what
is now the prevailing rule,12 that the defense of insanity is applicable
only when the defendant did not know the difference between right
and wrong.
The conflict between the broad "involuntary behavior" rule, and the
narrow definition of "insanity" in M'Nagbten's Case, soon became
apparent. A New York court, grappling with this conflict in 1881 in
the specific context of alcoholism, noted that although the alcoholic
drinks involuntarily, he does know the difference between right and
wrong.: Unfortunately, that court, and hundreds of others that fol-
lowed it, chose to adhere to the more widely-known rule of M'Nagh-
ten's Case, rather than to the basic concept of voluntariness. 4
In order to reconcile the inconsistent application of these two prin-
ciples, the courts resorted to a legal fiction. All drinking by a chronic
alcoholic was deemed, as a matter of law rather than as a matter of
9. See 4 BI.AcKsroNiE, COMMENTARIES 20, 21. For an interesting application of this
principle to a charge of public intoxication see Martin v. State, 31 Ala. App. 334, 17
So. 2d 427 (1944).
I0. See Blackstone, Commentaries 24, 25.
11. 10 C.&F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
12. But see United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (1966); Durham v. United States,
214 F.2d 862 (1954).
13. Flannagan v. People, 86 N.Y. 554 (1881).
14. See the cases collected in Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57
HARV. L. REv. 1045 (1944); and in Note, What Intoxication Will Excuse Crime, 36
L.R.A. 465 (1915), accompanying Harris v. United States, 8 App. D.C. 20, 36 L.R.A.
465 (1896).
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fact, to be "voluntary," on the theory that even the alcoholic had initially
been a voluntary drinker before becoming an alcoholic, and therefore
should be held legally accountable for his subsequent disease. Under
this legal fiction, a chronic alcoholic was held criminally responsible
for his public intoxication, as well as for any other anti-social conduct
caused by his drinking, even though that intoxication, and resulting
conduct, were the unavoidable products of his alcoholism.
In only one unique decision was this general rule rejected. In the case
of State v. Pike,"5 decided in 1869, the defendant was charged with
murder. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the questions
whether alcoholism is a disease, whether the defendant was suffering
from alcoholism, and whether the murder was the product of the de-
fendant's alcoholism, were all questions of fact relevant to determining
the defendant's criminal responsibility. In a remarkable concurring
opinion Judge Doe, one of this country's early great jurists, admonished
the legal profession not to permit ancient medical beliefs, long since
discredited, to become encrusted as legal principles:
"Defective medical theories [have] usurped the position of common-
law principles.
"The usurpation, when detected, should cease. The manifest im-
posture of an extinct medical theory pretending to be legal authori-
ty, cannot appeal for support to our reason or even to our sympathy.
The proverbial reverence for precedent, does not readily yield; but
when it comes to be understood that a precedent is medicine and not
law, the reverence in which it is held, will, in the course of time, sub-
side." 16
Judge Doe recognized that "When disease is the propelling uncontrol-
lable power, the man is as innocent as the weapon" and thus that, if
alcoholism had driven an individual involuntarily to commit murder,
he could not be convicted for even so serious an involuntary act. 17 But
the Pike decision stood alone for almost a century.
It is difficult to explain the judicial adherence for such a long period
of time to the legal fiction that, because alcoholism is a voluntarily-
acquired disease, an alcoholic's drinking must also be deemed to be
"voluntary." It has long been the rule, for example, that voluntarily-
induced insanity still excuses what would otherwise be criminal con-
15. 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
16. Id. at 438.
17. Id. at 441.
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duct.'8 Indeed, where long-continued voluntary drinking leads to in-
sanity (rather than merely alcoholism) the courts have always acknowl-
edged that anti-social conduct caused by that insanity cannot be crim-
inal.19 One is left, then, with the observation that the history of judicial
precedent in the field of alcoholism is explainable primarily as reflecting
moralistic principles, and a consequent reluctance to accept modern
medical knowledge. As one prominent professor of criminal law has
suggested, in attempting to explain the more rapid judicial acceptance
of medical advances in the field of mental illness, "traditional attitudes
of hostility towards drunkenness render rational and just determination
more difficult than in insanity cases." 20
II
This was the state of the criminal law pertaining to alcoholism prior
to 1966. And one finds total agreement-among the judiciary, the police,
the public prosecutors, the correctional officials, and public health
workers-that the handling of the country's chronic court inebriate prob-
lem under this criminal law concept has been an abject and dismal fail-
ure.
In early 1966, however, two Federal Courts of Appeals handed down
revolutionary decisions reversing the prior law. These decisions applied
modern knowledge about alcoholism to determine the criminal respon-
sibility of chronic alcoholics. In Easter v. District of Columbia,2' the
U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
the well-settled common law principle that conduct cannot be criminal
unless it is voluntary precludes the conviction of a chronic alcoholic for
public intoxication. In Driver v. Hinnant,22 the U. S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit-which includes the State of Virginia-held that
to convict a chronic alcoholic for public intoxication, and thus to ig-
nore the common law principle followed in Easter, violates the prohi-
18. See, e.g., United States v. Drew, 25 Fed. Cas. 993 (No. 14) (C.C. D. Mass. 1828);
Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424, 455 (1860).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Forbes, 25 Fed. Cas. 129 (No. 15) (E.D. Pa. 1845);
United States v. McGlue, 26 Fed. Cas. 679 (No. 16) (C.C.D. Mass. 1851).
20. HALi, supra note 12.
21. Supra note 1. The District of Columbia did not seek certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court from the District of Columbia Circuit's decision.
22. Supra note 2. The State of North Carolina did not seek certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court from the Fourth Circuit's decision.
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bition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.23
These cases constitute a unique and desirable merger of common
law doctrine and constitutional command.2 4 They squarely reject the
long-standing legal fiction that all drinking by a chronic alcoholic is
voluntary as a matter of law. Instead they accept, as established facts,
that chronic alcoholism is a disease and that the chronic alcoholic actual-
ly drinks involuntarily.25
In the Easter case, all eight judges recognized that "an essential ele-
ment of criminal responsibility is the ability to avoid the conduct speci-
fied in the definition of the crime," and that a chronic alcoholic "has
lost the power of self-control in the use of intoxicating beverages."
Thus, they unanimously held that no chronic alcoholic may be subjected
to criminal punishment for his public intoxication. And the significance
of this unanimity is underscored by the fact that observers of the court
know of no other en banc decision handed down by it within the past
ten years that has been unanimous.
The legal issue presented in Driver was somewhat narrower than the
issues presented in the Easter case. The North Carolina Supreme Court
had rejected both the common law and the constitutional arguments
presented by Driver.26 Thus, the only question that could subsequently
23. For comments on the Easter and Driver decisions see New York State Bar As-
sociation Committee on Public Health, Report on Alcoholism (Dec. 31, 1966); Note,
Acoholism, Public Intoxication and the Law, 2 COLUM. J. OF L. & Soc. PROB. 109 (1966);
Note, 12 WAYNE L. REv. 879 (1966); Comment, 4 HousTON L. REv. 276 (1966); 44
N.C. L. Rev. 818 (1966); 55 Ky. L. J. 201 (1966); 15 CATHOLIC U. L REv. 259 (1966);
3 TuLsA L. J. 175 (1966); Comment, 18 S. C. L. REv. 504 (1966); 54 GEo. L. J. 1422
(1966); 7 WM. & MARY L. REv. 394 (1966); 46 B.U. L. REv. 409 (1966); 11 VILL. L.
REV. 861 (1966); 23 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 402 (1966); Note 1966 DUKE L. J. 545 and
2 GA. ST. BJ. 239 (1965).
24. For additional cases in which the Easter-Driver approach to alcoholism has been
applied see Sweeney v. United States, 353 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1965); Gibbs v. Blackwell,
354 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1965); Schompert v. Celebrezze, 112 CONG. REc. 22718 (daily
ed., Sept. 22, 1966) (W.D. N.Y. 1966); People v. Dobney, 112 CONG. Rc. 22718 (daily
ed., Sept. 22, 1966) (Los Angeles Mun. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds (Los Angeles
Superior Ct. App. Div. 1966); News Syndicate Co., 44 L.A. 308 (1964). The United
States Supreme Court has recently declined to review a case raising the Easter-Driver
issues, with Justices Fortas and Douglas dissenting. Budd v. California, 385 U.S. 909
(1966). The Budd case suffered from a procedural defect which may have been a
factor in the Court's conclusion not to review it.
25. Cf. Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not?, 73 YALE L. J.
853 (1963).
26. State v. Driver, 262 N.C. 92, 136 S.E. 2d 208 (1964).
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be raised in a Federal court, in attempting to overturn the State court
determination, was the constitutional issue. The common law issue which
prevailed in the Easter case-the "involuntary behavior" argument-
could not be raised in the Driver case.
Nevertheless, even when faced with what lawyers would agree to be
the more difficult of the two questions, the constitutional issue, the
Fourth Circuit did not hesitate to decide in favor of Driver. It squarely
held that because Driver's public intoxication was caused by his illness,
chronic alcoholism, his criminal conviction constituted cruel and unusual
punishment and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
There is one final point about the Easter and Driver decisions that de-
serves special attention. In both cases it was strenuously argued that
alcoholism is a separate and distinct disease, albeit of uncertain etiology,
and is not a form of mental illness. It would have been very simple to
have argued that alcoholism is just another aspect of the well-known
insanity defense. It was concluded, however, that a decision based
upon insanity would have highly detrimental ramifications on the future
of alcoholic rehabilitation work. A substantial portion of defendant's
brief and oral argument in both courts was therefore spent explaining
that alcoholism is a recognized disease entity in its own right, not to
be confused with mental illness.
Both courts of appeal agreed completely with this approach. The
opinions refer to alcoholism in terms of a sickness or disease, and do
not consider it a form of mental illness.27
These decisions have wrought truly revolutionary changes upon the
law. Easter and Driver have struck down a practice that has been sanc-
tioned by everyday custom in England and the United States since
1606. They are the only two cases in history in which the courts took
it upon themselves to tell the legislature that activity previously handled
as a routine criminal matter is actually medical in nature and must be
taken out of the criminal system. Previous changes of this kind-for
example, recognition of insanity and epilepsy as medical rather than
criminal problems-were legislative, not judicial changes.
27. At least two other courts have reached the same conclusion. United States v.
Malafronte, 357 F.2d 629,,632 n.8 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. MacLeod, 83 F. Supp.
372 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
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III
The history of the criminal law as it applies to alcoholism has been
reviewed, and it has been shown how the Easter and Driver cases have
changed the law. But the most important questions lie ahead. What do
these decisions mean for the future of law enforcement and public
health in the State of Virginia and the rest of the country?
Recognition of chronic alcoholism as a complete defense to a charge
of public intoxication necessarily requires the conclusion that, like in-
sanity, it will also be a complete defense to a charge of any anti-social
activity of which it is the direct cause.2s This applies to any crime, rang-
ing from simply disorderly conduct to murder. On the other hand, it
may be that only very rarely will the defendant be able successfully to
prove the required causal connection between his alcoholism and the
crime committed. After all, alcoholism has been available as a defense
to murder in the State of New Hampshire since 1869, without any
devastating effects.
Some have become concerned that recognition of chronic alcoholism
as a defense to serious crimes will prejudice the good name of the alco-
holism movement. But if the respectability of the alcoholism movement
can be purchased only at the expense of jailing innocent victims of the
disease, who have involuntarily committed major crimes, then it is not
worth the price.
Some have raised the more basic question whether any public intoxi-
cation not accompanied by some form of disorderly conduct can prop-
erly be considered a crime.29 It was concluded that the point should not
be raised in the Easter and Driver cases because it would diffuse the
otherwise clear focus on the issues of chronic alcoholism itself.
It appears that criminal activity is often associated with intoxication,
even though it is very seldom associated with chronic alcoholism.30 If
this is true, a legislature might be justified in deciding to minimize the
lilcelihood of criminal activity by proscribing a major cause, intoxication.
On the other hand, one can name other major causes of crime-such as
simple unemployment-that could not constitutionally be designated
criminal.
28. This question is pursued at greater length in Hutt & Merrill, Is The Alcoholic
lnnnune From Criminal Prosecution? 6 MUN. CT. REv. 5 (1966), reprinted in 25 LEGAL
AID BRIEFCASE 70 (1966).
29. See, e.g., Murtagh, Arrests For Public Intoxication, 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1966).
30. See, e.g., Bacon, Alcohol, Alcoholism, And Crime: An Overview, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE MASSAcHUSErrs CONFERENCE ON ALCOHOL, ALCOHOLISM, AND CRIME 5 (1962).
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Putting aside constitutional considerations for the moment, the first
issue to be examined is whether there is any valid public policy for a
legislature to brand an intoxicated person, who is causing no public dis-
turbance, as a criminal. Reality must be faced. The public intoxication
laws never have been, and never will be, enforced uniformly upon the
public as a whole. The police do not pick up intoxicated party-goers
emerging from elegant dinner parties, or suburban country clubs. There
are as many intoxicated people on the streets of the exclusive George-
town area in Washington as there are in the skid row area, and one
should not be surprised that none of the Georgetown drunks are ar-
rested. The public intoxication statute is enforced against the poor and,
in particular, the homeless man.31
Should criminal laws be enacted which are aimed solely at a very
small, virtually defenseless, esthetically unacceptable segment of our pop-
ulation, with the intent of simply sweeping them off the streets and into
oblivion? The public intoxication statutes now on the books have no re-
deeming purpose, regardless of the issue of alcoholism, and should all
be repealed. Disorderly conduct statutes are quite sufficient to protect
the public, and these statutes should both be retained and fully en-
forced.32
With the Easter and Driver decisions now handed down, greater at-
tention is being focused throughout the country on the ramifications of
these decisions in two areas: First, how should the police, the prose-
cutors, and the judiciary handle chronic alcoholics found intoxicated
in public; and second, what should be done with the chronic inebriate
court offenders if they are not to be jailed.
With regard to the police handling of chronic alcoholics, it is not
a false arrest for a police officer to charge a chronic alcoholic with
public intoxication, even after the Easter and Driver decisions. The
31. See, e.g., D.C. CRIME COMMISSION REPORT 475-476; U.S. CRIME COMMISSION RE-
PORT 233-234.
32. The D.C. Crime Commission has unanimously reached the same conclusion:
"The Commission believes that public intoxication alone should not be a crime
in the District of Columbia. Criminal sanctions should be restricted to individuals
who, in addition to being intoxicated, behave in a disorderly manner so that they
substantially disturb other citizens." D.C. CaIME COMMISSION REPORT 495.
The D.C. Commission noted that "disorderly conduct" would not include "Persons who
are simply noisy, unable to walk properly, or unconscious" Id. at 496. The U.S. Crime
Commission has also unanimously supported this conclusion. "The Conmmission Recom-
mends: Drunkenness should not in itself be a criminal offense. Disorderly and other
criminal conduct accompanied by drunkenness should remain punishable as separate
crimes." U.S. CRiMz COMIvnSSION REPORT 236.
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police should not be required, at their peril, to make a judgment on
the street as to whether an intoxicated individual is or is not a chronic
alcoholic. Even in the case of known chronic alcoholics, moreover, the
availability of the defense of chronic alcoholism may be more properly
an issue for the courts. However, a number of responsible lawyers take
the position that, under the Easter and Driver decisions, any police de-
tention of a known chronic alcoholic for his public intoxication would
constitute a false arrest. This is a matter that requires immediate resolu-
tion. 3
The further question arises whether, if proper medical facilities exist,
the police may escort intoxicated individuals to this type of facility with-
out their consent without also incurring liability for a false arrest. But
the police have duties of a civil nature, in addition to their responsibility
for enforcing the criminal law. When a policeman escorts a heart at-
tack victim to the hospital, he is certainly not arresting him. Thus,
there is no question in my mind but that the police have both a right
and a duty to take unwilling intoxicated citizens, who appear to be un-
able to take care of themselves, whether or not they are alcoholics, to
appropriate public health facilities. Nevertheless, law enforcement offi-
cers have expressed considerable apprehension about the possible liability
of policemen for false arrest under these circumstances. Certainly, this
question should be cleared up immediately, in order to lay the necessary
foundation for the medical handling of alcoholics. 4
With regard to the handling of chronic alcoholics by prosecuting at-
33. Developments in the District of Columbia since this paper was delivered have led
the author to conclude that daily arrests of known alcoholics represents a deliberate
persecution that could properly be attacked as false arrests. One alcoholic was arrested
31 times in the 3 months following the Easter decision which, when the amount of
time he spent incarcerated in jail and in various hospitals is considered, amounted to
1 arrest for every 2 days that he appeared on the public streets. Memorandum in Sup-
port of Motion to Reopen Proceedings, District of Columbia v. Strother, D.C. Ct.
Gen. Sess. Crim. Div. No. 25861-66 (Sept. 14, 1966); U.S. CRIME COMMISSION REPORT 235.
The legal issue of false arrest should become moot upon implementation of the recom-
mendation of the D.C. and U.S. Crime Commissions that the old system of criminal ar-
rest be discarded and replaced with a modem public health system of medical care and
treatment. D.C. CRIME COMMISSION REPORT 490-503; U.S. CRIME COMMISSION REPORT 235-
237.
34. The D.C. Crime Commission is of the opinion that the common law permits
.this type of protective custody, relying upon Orvis v. Brickman, 196 F.2d 762 (D.C.
Cir. 1952) and long-standing custom, but nevertheless recommends enactment of a
protective custody statute to dispel any doubts. D.C. CRIME COMMISSIQN REPORT 497.
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torneys, it is instructive to refer to the Canons of Ethics of the Ameri-
can Bar Association. Canon 5 provides that "the primary duty of a law-
yer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that jus-
tice is done." 3 This does not mean, of course, that a prosecutor is obli-
gated to defend the man that he is prosecuting. It does mean, however,
that he is obligated to make certain that an innocent man is not con-
victed. In the context of the Easter and Driver decisions this means that
a prosecuting attorney is obligated either to drop the charges, or to
inform the judge of the relevant facts, whenever he has reason to be-
lieve that a defendant may have available to him the defense of chronic
alcoholism. 6 It is then up to the judge to protect the defendant's rights.
With regard to the judicial handling of chronic alcoholics, once the
judge becomes aware, through any information, of any kind, from any
source, that a defendant charged with public intoxication may have
available to him the defense of chronic alcoholism, he is clearly obli-
gated to make certain that the defense is adequately presentedY7 Cases
in the District of Columbia, involving the analogous defense of mental
illness, hold that even if the defendant protests, the judge is required
to inject the defense into the case sua sponte, to make certain that
an innocent man is not convicted. 38 A failure to do so is reversible
error as an abuse of the judge's discretion. A decision handed down by
the United States Supreme Court in March of last year is wholly con-
sistent with this position.39 And there is no reason why these precedents
should not be equally applicable to the defense of chronic alcoholism.
This means, of course, the demise of the so-called court honor pro-
grams for alcoholics, which have sprung up all over the country as the
judiciary's ad boo answer to the failure of public health officials to
treat alcoholism as a disease.40 If a defendant is found to be eligible for
a court's alcoholic program, then obviously he should not be convicted
35. See also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); Jackson, The Federal
Prosecutor, 24 J. Am. Jun. Socty 18 (1940).
36. The D.C. Crime Commission has reached the same conclusion. D.C. CIME Cozmr-
MASSION REPoRT 488.
37. This approach was adopted in District of Columbia v. Walters, 112 Cong. Rec.
22716 (daily ed., September 22, 1966), (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1966), and has been en-
dorsed by the D.C. Crime Commission. D.C. Camm Com zassIoN REPORT 487 & n.71.
38. Whalen v. United States, 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (en bane); Overholser v.
Lynch, 288 F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1961), reVd in part on other grounds, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
39. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
40. For a description of a typical court honor program see Burnett, The Legal Proc-
essing of the Alcoholic, in TBE LEAAL Issus IN ALcOHOLISmm AND USAGE 19 (1965).
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in the first place. The Easter and Driver decisions are fundamentally in
conflict with any type of judicially sponsored, post-conviction program
for the treatment of alcoholism. However benevolent such programs
may be, constitutionally they are a thing of the past, and should be left
to the public health service.
Among the possible alternatives to criminal handling of chronic al-
coholics, some form of civil commitment for involuntary treatment is
undoubtedly most frequently mentioned. In many states, indeed, civil
commitment statutes have already been enacted into law. Some deal
generally with mental illness and others specifically with alcoholism.4
Thus, those who are now turning their attention to possible solutions to
the problems that will arise when the Easter and Driver decisions are
fully implemented, readily turn to civil commitment procedures.
There are grave doubts, however, about the constitutionality and the
medical advisability of wholesale civil commitment of chronic alcoholics.
We have not fought for two years to extract DeWitt Easter, Joe Driver,
and their colleagues from jail, only to have them involuntarily commit-
ted for an even longer period of time, with no assurance of appropriate
rehabilitative help and treatment, to perhaps a far worse form of im-
prisonment. The euphemistic name "civil commitment" can easily hide
nothing more than permanent incarceration.
Those who might rush headlong to adopt civil commitment pro-
cedures should be cautioned, and reminded that just as difficult prob-
lems exist there as with the ordinary jail sentence. Thoughtful medical
and legal analysis of any new proposals is essential before they are
adopted.
There are many difficult questions that must squarely be faced and
resolved before new procedures for handling our chronic alcoholic dere-
lict population can be instituted. The following are some of the basic
constitutional issues involved.
Each individual, in his daily life, assumes an enormous number of
risks to life and limb. The habitual smoker assumes, according to the
Surgeon General's Report, a significantly increased risk of cancer and
other serious diseases. 42 Those who consume large amounts of dairy
products assume, according to the American Heart Association, a sig-
nificandy increased risk of heart disease.43 Even those who merely ride
41. For a compilation of state commitment procedures for alcoholics see Curran,
Civil Commitment of Alcoholics: A Legal Survey, in THE LEGAL ISSUES IN ALCOHOLISM
AND ALCOHOL USAGE 36, 53-70 (1965).
42. See "Smoking and Health," REPORT OF Tm ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON
GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HE.LH SERVICE, PHS pub. 1103 (1964).
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in automobiles daily risk life and limb.44
- These risks are assumed, for the most part, with full knowledge that
they exist. The ordinary individual simply balances the risk against the
pleasure and convenience which he derives from these activities, and
arrives at a personal judgment about his actions.
It has never been suggested that the habitual cigarette smoker, the
dairy product enthusiast, or the chronic automobile user be committed
to some form of appropriate institution to persuade him to change his
ways. This type of Kafka world has not yet arrived.
More pointedly, there are some who daily choose to hazard even far
greater risks than most individuals would choose. The airplane test
pilot, the war correspondent, the high trapeze artist, and the mountain
climber daily place their lives in jeopardy in a way that many people
would conclude to be ill-advised. Not only is there no law against their
activities, but, in many ways, society looks upon them as heroes whose
bravery in the face of danger is to be admired.
In what way then, is the alcoholic different? It may be that DeWitt
Easter and Joe Driver fully appreciate that their constant imbibing will
shorten their life expectancies. It may be that they prefer this way of
life to any other. And it may well be that, as a result, they want no
part of rehabilitative treatment, however enlightened it may be.
Is society to sit in judgment over these people, and put them away
against their wishes, just because their way of life is not of society's
choosing? If they are mentally competent to conclude that they prefer
the risks of freedom to the benevolent protection of commitment, can
society force the latter upon them anyway?
One must particularly be on guard to avoid the easy, but obviously
erroneous, assumption that an alcoholic who would prefer the risks
of freedom is necessarily not mentally competent to make that de-
cision. That assumption could as readily be made for the test pilot, the
war correspondent, and the mountain climber. Many ill people choose
not to undertake the medical treatment necessary to help them, but
society does not write them all off as mentally incompetent because of
that decision. The alcoholic's inability to control his drinking does not
ipso facto mean that he is incompetent to decide whether or not he
wishes to undergo appropriate treatment for his problem.45
43. See American Heart Association News Release on "Heart Association Issues New
Statement On Diet and Heart Disease," (June 5, 1964); Wall St. Journal 6 (June 10,
1964).
44. See NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965).
45. Cf. United States v. MacLeod, 83 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Pa. 1949), where the trial
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Closely related to this are the questions whether a likelihood of injury
to self or others is a constitutional prerequisite to civil commitment of
a chronic alcoholic, and whether the typical chronic alcoholic exhibits
any such likelihood. Everyone can agree that the typical skid row al-
coholic raises very little, if any, threat of physical harm to the com-
munity. He is typically passive, weak, and chronically debilitated.46
Thus, the real question is whether he exhibits sufficient likelihood of
injury to himself, or is so unable to take care of himself, that the com-
munity is justified in preventing self-inflicted harm.
This immediately raises, of course, the issue whether the type of
self-inflicted injury necessary to justify commitment must be traumatic,
as opposed to degenerative; imminent, as opposed to remote in time; and
acute, as opposed to chronic in nature. It is obvious that most people
subject to self-inflicted injuries are not committed to institutions. The
best example may be the elderly, whose increased senility exposes them
to all sorts of potential hazards-particularly bad falls within theik own
homes. The habitual cigarette smoker may also be shortening his life
span, just as the alcoholic is, yet society imposes no civil commitment
there, nor would the community tolerate it at this point in history. And
it would appear, incidentally, that the statistics on smoking are quite
similar to the type of statistics found on the effects of alcoholism on life
span.4 7
There is an equally serious question whether even the likelihood of
imminent and traumatic self-inflicted injury is sufficient to justify civil
commitment procedures if the individual concerned is judged to have
the mental capacity to make the decision for himself. Certainly, the
Indianapolis Speedway driver, the war correspondent, and the test pilot
are at least subject to imminent and traumatic self-inflicted harm as are
the skid row chronic alcoholics. Their projected life span might, indeed,
be considerably shorter. Even though one may doubt the wisdom of
their choice of occupation, one does not question their right to make
that choice if they are mentally competent to make it. One must also
be careful not to deny that freedom of choice to the chronic alcoholic.
judge concluded that a chronic alcoholic who was not suffering from a mental illness
was, when sober, mentally competent to stand trial on a criminal charge. If a sober
alcoholic is competent to stand trial, or make a contract, or vote, he is also competent
to decide whether to accept or reject treatment for his illness.
46. For a profile of the Skid Row alcoholic derelict see PIrTMAN & GORDON, REVOLV-
ING DOOR: A STUDY OF THE CHRONIC POLICE CASE INEBRIATE (1958).
47. See Tashiro & Lipscomb, Mortality Experience of Alcoholics, 24 Q.J. STUD. ON
ALCOHOL 203 (1963).
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Some have argued that one major factor distinguishes the alcoholic.
The public drunk, whether an alcoholic or the normal individual out
on a spree, is often unsightly. Even when not creating a public disturb-
ance, he may be something of an esthetic public nuisance. The typical
skid row alcoholic is, moreover, unquestionably a public charge who
creates monumental community problems, albeit not of a criminal na-
ture. Thus, control of a public charge and public nuisance has been sug-
gested by some as a possible constitutional justification for civil com-
mitment.48
Certainly, the habitual cigarette smoker or the war correspondent
would not fit into the category either of a public nuisance or of a
public charge. But whether the elderly would fit into these categories
may depend upon the individual concerned. The problem of the con-
stitutionality of civil commitment of a destitute and senile individual
was recently considered by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in an en bane case argued the same day as the
Easter case. 9 The Court was badly split on the issues, and it is difficult
to derive any basic principle from the four opinions they rendered. It
appears, however, that the majority of the Court agree that civil com-
mitment must involve the least deprivation of freedom consistent with
the possibility of effective care and treatment. The case was therefore re-
manded to the trial judge for a hearing as to whether some form of
less restrictive nursing home care could be found in lieu of the full-time
residential care she was then receiving in a hospital.
It must be remembered that if civil commitment of a chronic alco-
holic is to be tolerated solely on the grounds of controlling a public
charge and public nuisance, then civil commitment of all public charges
and public nuisances is similarly justifiable. In essence, it would make
no difference whether the individual was simply a homeless derelict or
an alcoholic. Indeed, it would make no difference whether he was a
destitute cripple, or a member of the vast group of our able-bodied but
unemployed population who derives his support primarily from wel-
fare payments. If a chronic alcoholic can be civilly committed because
he is esthetically unacceptable, then the same would apply to all these
others. This prospect is as frightening as it is obviously unacceptable.
48. This appears to be the suggestion in Curran, Civil Commitment of Alcoholics: A
Legal Survey, in The Legal Issues in Alcoholism and Alcohol Usage 36, 40-47 (1965),
relying upon Ex parte Hinkle, 33 Idaho 605, 196 Pac. 1035 (1921).
49. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 196) (en banc). See also Rouse v.
Cameron, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1966), in which a divided court held that an in-
voluntary patient in a mental institution has a right to adequate -treatment.
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This cursory review suggests two very broad, and perhaps not very
helpful, conclusions. First, to the extent that treatment for alcoholism
can be kept on a purely voluntary basis, extremely difficult constitu-
tional questions can be avoided. Second, to the extent that treatment
under civil commitment procedures can be provided primarily through
out-patient facilities requiring a minimum loss of freedom for the al-
coholic, such as half-way houses as contrasted with full-time residential
facilities, those same difficult constitutional problems can at least be
minimized.50
This is not to suggest that easy answers are readily available with re-
gard to the broad constitutional and other legal limitations on civil com-
mitment procedures or any other type of procedures that might be
used in handling the chronic alcoholic. The fact is that not enough re-
search and hard thinking, necessary before intelligent conclusions can be
reached on these questions, has been done. But two points are obvious.
First, some treatment must be made available to the chronic court in-
ebriate offender. And second, some person or group of persons must sit
down and make a hard legal and medical analysis of the questions just
raised before new treatment procedures are adopted.5'
50. The D.C. Crime Commission recognizes that "the constitutionality of a civil com-
mitment law for alcoholics, in the absence of a criminal charge, is far from clear," and
recommends that harmless alcoholics (those not charged with disorderly conduct) be
treated entirely on a voluntary rather than an involuntary basis. The sole situation in
which the Commission concluded that even "short-term" involuntary commitment of
harmless alcoholics may be justified is where they are "severely debilitated" and there-
fore "pose a direct threat of immediate injury to themselves." The Commission recog-
nized that many homeless alcoholics "have poor diagnoses, and may never become
self-sufficient," and recommended that:
"For these unfortunate people, simple humanity demands that we stop treating
them as criminals and provide voluntary supportive services and residential facilities
so that they can survive in a decent manner."
D.C. CRimE COMMIssioN REPORT 499, 501. The U.S. Crime Commission has also con-
cluded that "the decision to continue treatment should be left to the individual." U.S.
CRIME COMMISSION REPORT 236.
51. The D.C. and U.S. Crime Commissions which completed their analysis after
this paper was delivered, have both recommended voluntary treatment procedures,
taking into account the legal and medical aspects of the problem. The National
Institute of Mental Health is presently studying the feasibility of such an analysis. In
the meanwhile a bill has been introduced in the House of Representatives "to provide
a comprehensive program for the control of drunkenness and the prevention and
treatment of alcoholism in the District of Columbia," which adopts the D.C. and U.S.
Crime Commissions' recommendations. H. R. 6143, 90th Congress, 1st Sess.
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